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the canon. For instance, Margaret Cavendish’s and Mary Astell’s writings
about social and metaphysical liberty provide important insight into the
link between the human and moral order in early modern Europe.
But this criticism is by no means meant to indicate that the aim of the
volume is not met. Watkins has done an excellent job of demonstrating the
richness and promise of the narrative of order. The volume should serve as
a call to specialists and advanced students in the field to develop and extend these themes within the systems discussed here and to other thinkers
in the history of philosophy.

Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith, by Robert
MacSwain. Leuven: Peeters, 2013. xiii + 275 pages. $88.74 (paper).
BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE, Queens’ College, Cambridge
This book is unquestionably a major contribution to the study of Austin
Farrer’s writings and to philosophical reflection on the topic of faith and
reason. It still betrays its origin in a doctoral dissertation, but its thoroughness in knowledge of relevant sources and background, and of fascinating
biographical detail about Farrer, is most impressive. One cannot resist a
wry smile, however, at the presence of so many long footnotes in a book
about an author who forswore footnotes altogether.
Austin Farrer, regarded by many as the leading Anglican philosophical
theologian of the twentieth century, was for many years Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford. He ended his career as Warden of Keble.
His many books include Finite and Infinite, The Glass of Vision, The Freedom
of the Will, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Saving Belief, A Science of God?,
and Faith and Speculation. What has impressed his colleagues, pupils, hearers (he was a great preacher too), and readers was the way in which he
combined philosophical skill, theological acumen, and profound spirituality. Readers of MacSwain’s book will want to ask whether a sufficiently
balanced picture of Farrer’s many-sidedness is maintained.
The title of the book should first be explained. “Solved by Sacrifice—solvitur immolando” was Farrer’s parody of the solution to Zeno’s well-known
paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, which “solvitur ambulando,” that is,
is solved by carrying on walking and overtaking the tortoise, not by continuously stopping and thinking at fifty per cent segments of the distance
behind. Similarly, Farrer urges (in a sermon, be it noted), Christian faith
finds its justification, not in logic or argument, but in actually following
the way of the cross and finding spiritual blessedness thereby. This is
manifestly true of the saints and up to a point of the ordinary believer
pp. 490–492
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too. Reference to such experiential justification of religious belief certainly
played an increasingly important role in Farrer’s writing about faith and
reason, but it remained only one element in his blend of spirituality, theology and philosophy. Readers of Faith and Philosophy will be forgiven if they
find themselves wanting to focus as much on the latter two as on the first
of these three elements.
MacSwain takes his starting point from the initial fear expressed by
Farrer’s friend and colleague, Basil Mitchell, on reading the MS of Farrer’s
last book, Faith and Speculation, that Farrer “had become a sort of fideist.”
Mitchell later withdrew this complaint, concluding, rightly in my judgment, that Farrer remained a rationalist to the end. MacSwain rejects this,
holding that, largely under the influence of the Princeton philosopher/
theologian, Diogenes Allen, Farrer did indeed become at least a moderate
fideist.
Of course it depends what you mean by “fideist.” MacSwain devotes
his second chapter to this question, setting aside pejorative senses of the
term, and distinguishing mainly between an “extreme fideism” that appeals to faith alone and a “moderate fideism” that begins with faith but
allows for rational defense and exploration from within faith’s commitment and perspective. The latter was Allen’s position and MacSwain’s thesis is that Farrer eventually came very close to this view, not only in Faith
and Speculation but also in earlier sermons and essays as well. The term
“fideism” remains pretty slippery, however, and it does not help to find
the notion of “semi-fideism” introduced. This is held to be an approach
that begins with faith but at the same time permits support and clarification by probabilistic natural theology and by theology of revelation, as in
the work of Basil Mitchell and even of Richard Swinburne. At this point
one would really have preferred the term “fideism” to be dropped and
the discussion conducted simply in terms of the relation between faith
and reason, as it was by Farrer himself.
Certainly Farrer was not a foundationalist. Faith is not founded on reason. Farrer begins with faith, both in the sense of the Christian faith, that
is, the tradition handed down and expressed in the creeds, and also in the
sense of the believer’s personal faith, although he allows, in sermons as
well as in his books, this starting point to be no more than exploratory, an
“initial faith” open to enquiry and critique. (I would not wish to contrast
an open heart with an open mind here as MacSwain does. A mindless
heart only means fideism in the pejorative sense.) It would, of course, be
absurd to suggest that the believer has also to be a philosopher, but both
the faith tradition and personal faith have metaphysical presuppositions
and implications; and these are what Farrer was primarily concerned with
throughout his writing career, right up to Faith and Speculation.
The reason why MacSwain gives perhaps too much prominence to the
influence of Diogenes Allen on the development of Farrer’s thought is his
decision to focus primarily on religious epistemology in Farrer’s work
to the relative neglect of metaphysics and doctrine. This is fair enough if
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one’s main interest is faith and reason, but a rounded picture of Farrer’s
importance as a philosophical theologian is distorted if his spirituality is
allowed to overshadow his philosophy and theology. As I say, what has
impressed enthusiasts for Farrer’s work is the way he combined these elements and held them in creative tension.
Certainly Zeno’s paradox solvitur ambulando. But it is also solved by rational reflection on the difference between continual motion and segmental
haltings. Similarly, the paradox of faith solvitur immolando. But it is also
open to the rational support and clarification by what Rowan Williams
called Farrer’s “viable and sophisticated natural theology,” of which Austin
Farrer remained a masterful exponent till the end.

Philosophical Religions from Plato to Spinoza: Reason, Religion, and Autonomy,
by Carlos Fraenkel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 358
pages. $79.00 (hardcover).
JAMES BRYSON, McGill University
In a bold and exciting new book, Carlos Fraenkel traces a tradition of what
he calls “philosophical religion” from its beginnings in ancient Athens
through Jewish and Christian Alexandria and through medieval Arabic
falsafa, arriving finally at the early modern thought of Spinoza, who represents both the culmination of this tradition as well as a challenge to its
legitimacy by planting the seeds of biblical criticism. This is no mere historical exercise. Fraenkel presents philosophical religion as a response to
the Enlightenment confidence in the rational autonomy of the individual,
which he sees as the greatest challenge to maintaining religious culture
within the parameters of evolving modern institutions that prize the
equality of all persons ahead of religious authority.
Fraenkel explains that the post-Enlightenment consensus which separates philosophy from religion would puzzle historical proponents of
philosophical religion, who are called to become God-like through the
perfection of reason, as Plato teaches in the Theaetetus. Thus philosophy
is the highest form of worship, for which it simultaneously provides the
foundation. Beginning with the metaphysical concept that God is Reason,
historical forms of religion are regarded as exhortations to the practice
of philosophy. Homer, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed employ revelation
as a tool to set their respective religious communities, composed principally of non-philosophers, on a path to the philosophical life. This way of
reading historical religion is an alternative to cultural revolution, which
would remake society in the image of an ideal Republic based on pure
pp. 492–494
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